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ABSTRACT 
 
A GENETIC ALGORITHM-BASED SEARCH  
FOR PARAMETRIC REFORM ALTERNATIVES  
FOR THE TURKISH PENSION SYSTEM: 2005-2060  
Alparslan, Mustafa Artun 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Serdar Sayan 
 
August 2005 
 
In this thesis, we search for parametric reform alternatives so as to achieve a 
balance in the long term accumulated difference between pension expenditures and 
revenues of the SSI, the largest pension fund in Turkey, from 2005 to 2060.  The 
projected worker-retiree composition of the pension system is allowed to change along 
with proposed policy changes in contribution and replacement rates. These changes in 
population structure are modeled by estimated work and pension income elasticities of 
labor supply values so that the resulting changes in the incomes of the worker could now 
affect the retirement decision. Possible policy alternatives are then found by a genetic 
algorithm developed for this purpose. Finally, the results obtained from the program are 
compared with previous and current reform proposals.  
 
Keywords: Pension Reform, Genetic Algorithms
  iv
ÖZET 
 
TÜRK EMEKLİLİK SİSTEMİ İÇİN PARAMETRİK REFORM  
ALTERNATİFLERİNİN  GENETİK ALGORİTMA YARDIMIYLA SAPTANMASI: 
2005-2060  
Alparslan, Mustafa Artun 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Serdar Sayan 
 
Ağustos 2005 
 
Bu tezde, Türk emeklilik sisteminin 2005-2060 yılları arasındaki uzun vadeli 
gelir gider dengesini sağlayabilecek parametrik reform alternatifleri aranmaktadır. 
Çalışmada, öncekilerden farklı olarak SSK’ya tabi nüfusun uzun dönem tahmini çalışan-
emekli bileşiminde bağlama ve prim oranlarında yapılacak ayarlamaları takiben 
gözlenecek değişiklikler gözönüne alınmaktadır. Bu değişiklikler, çalışan ve emekli 
maaşlarındaki hareketlerin işgücü yapısı üzerindeki etkilerini tahmin etmeyi 
kolaylaştıran, esneklik tahminleri kullanılarak modellenmektedir. Bu çerçevede  
muhtemel politika alternatifleri bu amaçla geliştirilen bir genetik algoritma yardımıyla 
saptanmaktadır. Elde edilen sonuçlar şu anda gündemde olan ya da yakın geçmişte 
uygulanmış reform alternatifleriyle karşılaştırılmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Emeklilik Reformu, Genetik Algoritmalar  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 The reason of existence for any government is to provide its citizens with 
some basic services such as security, justice, and education. In this framework, a 
social security system plays an important role by letting elderly citizens maintain 
at least a minimum living standard after they become unable to pay for their 
consumption with their labor. 
A common approach to help retired workers pay for their own consumption 
is to operate a pension system which collects premiums from the current worker’s 
paychecks to finance the elderly workers through a distribution system. The 
system is called Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) to accentuate the re-distribution aspect.  
The PAYG systems were first established in the second half of the 19th 
century to fund the current retirees with contributions out of current worker’s 
income while promising the current workers the same treatment when they have 
reached their old age. The high ratio of workers to retirees at the time of their 
establishment enabled PAYG systems to run surpluses for several decades, 
despite generous retirement benefits they provided. In Europe, the baby-boomers 
of the 1940s and 1950s helped maintain these high worker retiree ratios, keeping 
the PAYG systems running without incurring deficits. Yet, increasing life-
expectancies caused the number of retirees to increase and decreasing fertility 
 2 
rates slowed down the growth in the number of workers in many countries leading 
to pensions crises. It became obvious in many OECD countries, for example, that 
the fast-graying population cannot be funded by the current workers without 
initiating serious policy changes (Kenc and Sayan 2001a).  
In one of the early contributions recognizing the problem, Auerbach et. al. 
(1989) studied four OECD countries using an OLG model and warned against the 
dangers of declining worker to retiree ratios ahead. Likewise, Chand and Jaeger 
(1996) noted the importance of the implications of aging in a society from the 
point of view of pension systems, and discussed how balances could be controlled 
by changes in the fundamental parameters of the system: the rate of contributions 
out of workers’ wages (contribution rate), the rate of work time average of wages 
replaced by pension income (replacement rate), and the minimum retirement age. 
Chand and Jaeger (1996) concluded by pointing to the need to create a fully-
funded, defined contribution scheme within or outside the existing PAYG 
systems, since the PAYG system balances would continue to deteriorate unless 
necessary steps are taken to ensure a smooth transition to accommodate the 
requirements of the demographic developments ahead to remedy the system.  
The establishment of PAYG pension funds in Turkey followed the same 
natural path in the aftermath of World War 2 through the creation of three 
different pension funds: Emekli Sandığı (ES), Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu (SSK), 
and  Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ve Diğer Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sigorta Kurumu (BAĞ-
KUR), for three different types of workers: public sector employees, private 
sector employees, and self-employed craftsmen and artisans, respectively.  The 
ratio of workers to retirees remained high in the following decades until the 
1980s. In fact, this ratio was expected to stay high enough not to cause concern at 
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least until the 2020s because of the high fertility rates in Turkey. Thus, unlike its 
counterparts in other OECD countries the Turkish pension system could be run 
without the need for drastic changes in pension parameters. Nevertheless, pension 
balances in Turkey quickly deteriorated starting from the 1990s due to the 
shortsighted and populist interventions by the policy makers (TUSIAD, 2004).  
A political decision in 1992 aimed to reap the benefits of popular support 
lowered the minimum retirement age to as low as 38 in women and 43 in men 
who have paid their premiums for 20 years to earn their retirement. This implied 
that anyone contributing to the system for 20 years could continue to receive 
retirement benefits for the next 35 years (MLSS/SSI, 2004). The expected effect 
for the government was increased popularity among the working people by 
retiring them from the workforce earlier than usual and transferring their old jobs 
to younger workers to reduce unemployment, and hence to gain more popularity. 
Furthermore, the amount of pension income provided to the retirees often 
exceeded their active working wages, increasing people’s incentive to retire early. 
The young retirees often continued to work in their old jobs after retirement 
thereby avoiding premium payments and complementing their wages with 
pension income. As a result, the expected employment generation effects were not 
observed (MLSS/SSI, 2004; Sayan, 2005). Combined with the mismanagement of 
accumulated funds during the early decades of the pension system, the lack of 
political will to stop leakages due to the number of unregistered workers, and the 
reluctance to punish the employers who did not pay their contribution rates on 
time, the pension system began to report considerable deficits after the 1990s 
(Sayan, 2005). 
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The government’s first attempt to correct this problem (via the social 
security reform of 1999) involved increasing the minimum retirement age to 58 
for women and 60 for men after a transition period of 10 years. However, the non-
linear age increasing scheme was soon ruled out by the Constitutional Court on 
the grounds of violating social justice. The Court required a smoother transition in 
increasing retirement ages and the government had to extend the transition period 
to 20 years while decreasing the minimum retirement age to 56 for women and 58 
for men. 
The following figure taken from MLSS/SSI (2004) shows the transfers 
made by the Treasury to social security institutions in terms of the ratio of 
transfers to the nation’s GDP. 
 
Figure 1: Transfers to Social Security Institutions by the Treasury 
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The figure shows a steady increase in transfers to GDP ratio until 1999 
when a major parametric reform was legislated. The decline in the SSI deficit 
indicates the temporary success of the 1999 act to rectify the situation. However, 
with the help of a ruling of the Turkish Constitutional Court, which found the 
1999 act to be violating social justice, the steady increase in budgetary transfers to 
social security institutions could not be stopped and total social security deficit 
reached up to 4.5% of the GDP in 2003. The amount of transfers made to these 
institutions in 2004 was 5 percent of the GDP, or USD 15 billion. Furthermore, 
total value of transfers made to the social security system by the end of 2003 
discounted at Turkish Treasury Bill interest rates translates to 345 billion New 
Turkish Liras, or 1.24 times the total consolidated government debt at the time 
(MLSS/SSI, 2004).  
Having recognized the magnitude of the problem, various researchers also 
studied parametric reform alternatives and their consequences. Sayan and Kenc 
(1999) used an overlapping generations (OLG) general equilibrium model to 
study the effects of increasing retirement ages in Turkey. Sayan and Kiraci 
(2001a) and Sayan and Kiraci (2001b) investigated alternatives based on grid 
search techniques to find reasonable retirement age, contribution and replacement 
rate combinations to minimize the pension deficit over a model horizon between 
1995 and 2060. These studies were significant as they were the first attempts to 
formally model balances of the Turkish pension system in a 66-year horizon, 
forward-looking framework to suggest sustainable parameter configurations. 
Sayan and Turhan-Sayan (2001) used a genetic algorithm approach to speed up 
the slow grid-search process to identify parametric reform alternatives over the 
2000-2060 period. They, however, did not consider the effects of changes in 
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contribution and replacement rates on choices between work and retirement 
decisions. 
An OLG model was used in TUSIAD (2004) to study the general 
equilibrium effects of a transition from the PAYG system to the funded system. 
The study showed that such a transition could boost the GDP as much as two 
percent per year. 
The approach to be followed in this thesis is based on Sayan and Turhan-
Sayan (2001). Even though the genetic algorithm developed there is very 
efficient, the interaction between the number of workers and retirees and changes 
in pension parameters could be modeled more realistically to find more relevant 
policy choices for the Turkish pension system.   
Furthermore, Sayan and Turhan-Sayan (2001) create a model of the SSI 
system where optimal values of the retirement age can be searched for all years 
between 2000 and 2060, while the contribution and replacement rates can only be 
changed once and for all during the whole model horizon. Modifying the model in 
such a way to let all parameters be changed as frequently as a year would give a 
wider range of alternatives to policy makers. 
The purpose of this thesis is to extend the work of Sayan and Turhan-Sayan 
(2001) by allowing for the projected worker-retiree composition to change along 
with the changes in contribution and replacement rates according to the estimated 
elasticity values so that the resulting changes in the incomes of the worker could 
now affect the retirement decision. Coupled with the possibility of yearly changes 
in contribution and replacement rates towards their optimal values introduced to 
the model here, it will become possible to observe whether the results in Sayan 
and Turhan-Sayan (2001) can be improved upon.  
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The organization of the thesis is as follows. The next chapter provides a 
brief introduction to the genetic algorithms. Chapter 3 describes the model used, 
while the associated results are presented in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 
concludes the discussion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
GENETIC ALGORITHMS 
 
 
 
 A genetic algorithm (GA) is a set of instructions that try to maximize or 
minimize an objective function by mimicking the survival-of-the-fittest 
mechanism of the nature as described in the Darwinian theory of evolution. To 
illustrate the idea, let us consider reproduction of a species. A population of 
species creates a pool of offspring, each born carrying a combination of the 
hereditary content of both of its parents. The offspring is then released into the 
nature.  An offspring with a high quality genetic inheritance can adapt quickly to 
the nature and has a higher chance of survival and reproduction than others with a 
lower quality genetic inheritance. The offspring with higher quality genetic 
material eventually reach the reproduction stage where they mate with other high-
quality genetic material offspring to produce more offspring that are even better 
equipped to survive. Certain mutations along the way could further enhance the 
survival chances of upcoming parents and hence their offspring. Thus, the 
survival-of-the-fittest mechanism explains how genetic material improves to make 
the population better suited to their surroundings with the passage of each 
generation.  
The use of this idea in solving an optimization problem was first suggested 
by John Holland in the early 1960s (Holland, 1992). To see how he has 
transformed the elements of the theory of natural selection as the building blocks 
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of a computer algorithm, one must first introduce basic concepts of the natural 
selection process.  
Genes are the most crucial element distinguishing an individual from others 
and the sole constructs that carry information about an individual’s inherited 
characteristics. They are basically certain molecules (bases) lined up on a long 
molecule-chain called the DNA. In nature, a DNA strand contains four different 
bases adenine, thymine, guanine and cytosine (abbreviated A, T, G, and C 
respectively). The line-up of these bases contains instruction codes for every 
chemical process in the cell, defining the fitness of the cell in nature. Shortly, 
genes in biology represent a string that carries an individual’s unique properties 
for nature’s processing. Such a string of length n, where n is a natural number, 
contains 4n different combinations of line-up and carries immense possibilities for 
biological diversity.  
Even though combining four different symbols to construct a string is also 
possible in computer science, it is generally easier to construct a string made up 
0’s and 1’s (called a binary string or a chromosome) due to the binary nature of 
computation theory. This is a very useful concept since the bit-strings formed to 
represent the genetic inheritance properties of the cell can now be easily evaluated 
by a fitness function. A binary bit string A is formally represented as 
NnA n ∈∈ ,}1,0{ , e.g.           
A 6 bit binary string  → 0 1 0 0 1 0
Corresponding to sexual reproduction in nature is a biological term, cross-
over. Crossing over is the creation of new genetic content from two parents by 
means of a random exchange of the corresponding parts of the DNA strands. 
Crossing over process promotes diversity in the nature and helps produce new 
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generations capable of adapting to nature. This process has its counterpart in a GA 
which works through the exchange of the bits indexed before the cross-over point 
with each other while keeping the chromosome order. The process yields two new 
chromosomes. The cross-over operation can be formally described by letting 
nBA }1,0{, ∈  be the binary strings and }1,...,1{ −∈ nc be the randomly chosen 
cross-over point. Now, let any binary string A be divided into two binary strings 
−
cA  and 
+
cA  where 
−
cA  represents the binary string formed by the first c bits of A. 
Naturally, +cA  represents the rest of A.  Then, the functional form becomes: 
( , , ) ( , ), , ,c c c cCrossOver A B c C D where C A B D B A
− + − += = =  
A 6 bit Crossing-Over Example where c=3: 
 
A 1 0 1 0 0 0  B 0 1 0 1 0 1 
               
C 1 0 1 1 0 1  D 0 1 0 0 0 0 
  
         The nature’s role in this process is twofold. First of all, it decides on the 
offspring’s genetic content quality. In a GA, this role is captured by assigning a 
fitness value to the bit-strings with the help of a fitness function. Formally, a 
fitness function can be represented as: 
ℜ∈∈→ FAFAf n ,}1,0{,)(  
where A is a length n binary string and F is a real number. The function f is 
generally assumed to assign higher values to the fitter binary strings. 
The second role of the nature is the selection of pairs for reproduction. 
Genetically fit individuals have a higher chance to survive. They may also have 
some additional characteristics that help them find mates more easily than others. 
Then, those positive qualities of that individual would have a higher chance of 
being passed on to the next generation. This is replicated in a GA by ranking the 
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fitness of individuals and associating a reproduction criterion to that ranking. For 
instance, “The Roulette Wheel Parent Selection Technique” takes the fittest (say 
10) chromosomes from the population and lets them reproduce according to their 
fitness values. This way, each chromosome gets to reproduce with a probability 
}10,...,2,1{,)( 10
1
∈=
∑
=
k
F
F
RP
i
i
k
k . In cases where some of the fitness values are 
negative, it is always possible to assign positive values to the fitness values by 
adding a positive constant to all of the fitness values. Since the value of the added 
constant affects the probability distributions greatly, the selection of this constant 
is an issue of algorithm design. If one does not want to assign probabilities, the 
same probability for reproduction can always be assumed for all, again say 10, 
fittest chromosomes.    
However, in some cases the whole population might be involved in 
reproduction instead of the fittest, say, ten. This would decrease the best 
individuals’ rates of survival but increase the diversity in the population to create 
more potent candidates for reproduction. This is called soft selection and has been 
shown to outdo some hard selection algorithms in terms of more rapid rates of 
improvement in for some evolutionally stagnant populations. Galar (1989) shows 
that soft selection methods proved to be more efficient than hard ones in crossing 
Gaussian multimodal regions. This is a result of the adaptability that the least fit 
individuals might bring into the system.  
Another important factor in natural selection process is mutations. 
Mutations are changes in the gene-content of the offspring independent of the 
crossing-over process. When applied to GA’s mutations are random one or 
possibly more bit changes in the chromosome. With some preassigned 
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probability, a zero at a particular location in the bit-string of an offspring may be 
changed to one or a one may be changed to zero. 
Based on the terminology introduced, the algorithm can be verbally 
described as follows. After binary strings and the fitness functions are designed, 
an initial population is created randomly. That population is then evaluated by the 
fitness function. At the next stage, the population creates a new generation by 
means of crossing-over and mutation. This population too is ranked according to 
the fitness value. If a preset fitness criterion is satisfied by any of the 
chromosomes, the algorithm stops. If not, a new population is initiated from the 
existing one. 
A flowchart for the algorithm is given in the next page in Figure 2. 
A simple optimization task can be designed to demonstrate the use of 
genetic algorithms. Consider a simple optimization problem such as a finding the 
nearest point to the zero of a cubic function defined over a given interval. 
Assume that the algorithm searches for the point which makes the value of 
the curve 3( ) ( 4)f x x= −  closest to zero. Naturally, the desired point for this curve 
is attained at 4x =  and the desired value is 0. Now, let the search be in the region 
[0,7.5]x∈ . This means that the chromosomes making up the population should 
be designed so that their range is [0,7.5]x∈ . Now, define a 4-bit chromosome in 
this range such that every chromosome represents a different point in the  
[0,7.5]x∈  region to represent the whole population of possible solutions. Thus 
the solution is said to have a 4-bit depth in the desired solution domain. 
Furthermore, imposing a linear distribution of points in the domain might be 
desirable and convenient. Then, a function g(A), which has a 4-bit binary string or 
equivalently a four-digit number in modulo 2 as domain, maps 4{0,1}A∈  to its  
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Figure 2: Flowchart for the Main Genetic Algorithm 
 
Enter: 
- the problem to be solved  
-the initial population count 
-the discount factor 
-work and pension income and 
demographic projections 
-Income elasticities of labor 
supply 
Initialize population to represent possible policy 
reform candidates. 
Use the initial population to update the worker 
and retiree matrices to for each and every 
chromosome in the population.  
Evaluate the fitness of each chromosome and 
rank them according to their fitness. 
Create a new generation through Roulette 
Wheel Parent Selection, Crossing-Over and 
Mutation Techniques. 
Use this generation to update the worker and 
retiree matrices to for each and every 
chromosome in the generation.  
Are there any fit chromosomes?
NO YES
Evaluate the fitness of each chromosome and 
rank them according to their fitness. 
Terminate and display results. 
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relative range value, [0,7.5]x∈ . Here 21( ) 0 mod ( )2g A A= + , where 0 is the 
starting point of the fitness function’s search range ( [0,7.5]x∈ ), 1
2
 is the step 
size between each element in the search range, and 2mod ( )A  represents the 
possible values that any chromosome might take. Note that the minimal and 
maximal domain values for the fitness functions are achieved at 0000A =  and 
1111A = , respectively. 
0 1 2 3
2mod (0000) 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0(0000) 0 0
2 2 2
g ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅= + = = =
0 1 2 3
2mod (1111) 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 15(1111) 0 7.5
2 2 2
g ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅= + = = =  
The fitness of each chromosome should increase in proportion with its 
closeness to zero. Assigning the fitness function below to the chromosomes 
fulfills this requirement. 
3
32
1 1 1( ) mod ( )| ( ( )) | 2 | ( ( ) 4) | 2 | ( 4) | 2
2
F A Af g A g A
= = =+ − + − +
 
where the constant 2 is added to the denominator of the function, ( )F A , to 
avoid any possible zeros in the denominator.  
Now, the population is initiated with four chromosomes chosen randomly 
from the whole population of 42 16= . Then, the respective reproduction 
probability for a four-chromosome initial population is  
10
1
( )( ) , {1, 2,3, 4}
( )
k
k
i
i
F AP A k
F A
=
= ∈
∑
 
Let these initial chromosomes, their associated fitness and their reproduction 
probabilities be given as  
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1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3
1 1 1
4 4 4
1100 ( ) 6.0 ( ) 0.1000 ( ) 0.0808
0111 ( ) 3.5 ( ) 0.4760 ( ) 0.3804
1010 ( ) 5.0 ( ) 0.3333 ( ) 0.2694
0110 ( ) 3.0 ( ) 0.3333
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ 14( ) 0.2694A =
 
As seen from the above results, the fittest chromosome is the 2nd one since it 
has the highest probability of passing on to the next generation. These probability 
values are then used to create the next generation by “The Roulette Wheel Parent 
Selection Technique”. Assume that after the necessary random number 
generations, the following chromosomes were attached to each other in the 
following cross-over places. 
2 1 1
1 3 1
2 1 1
2 4 2
2 1 1
3 2 3
2 1 1
4 3 4
( , ,1) 1100
( , , 2) 0111
( , ,1) 0010
( , ,3) 1010
A CrossOver A A
A CrossOver A A
A CrossOver A A
A CrossOver A A
= =
= =
= =
= =
 
The second generation’s fitness values are reported below. 
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
2 2 2
4 4 4
1100 ( ) 6.0 ( ) 0.1000 ( ) 0.0807
0111 ( ) 3.5 ( ) 0.4760 ( ) 0.3800
0010 ( ) 1.0 ( ) 0.0345 ( ) 0.2701
1010 ( ) 5.0 ( ) 0.3333
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ 24( ) 0.2691A =
 
The third generation is reproduced by the same process. 
3 2 2
1 4 2
3 2 2
2 2 4
3 2 2
3 1 4
3 2 2
4 2 1
( , ,1) 1111
( , , 2) 0110
( , ,3) 1100
( , , 2) 0100
A CrossOver A A
A CrossOver A A
A CrossOver A A
A CrossOver A A
= =
= =
= =
= =
 
The third generation’s fitness values are also reported below. 
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3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3
4 4 4
1111 ( ) 7.5 ( ) 0.0223 ( ) 0.0233
0110 ( ) 3.0 ( ) 0.3333 ( ) 0.3488
1100 ( ) 6.0 ( ) 0.1000 ( ) 0.1046
0100 ( ) 4.0 ( ) 0.5000
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ 34( ) 0.5232A =
 
The fourth generation is reproduced by the same process. 
4 3 3
1 4 3
4 3 3
2 4 4
4 3 3
3 3 2
4 3 3
4 3 3
( , , 2) 0100
( , ,3) 0100
( , , 2) 1110
( , , 2) 1100
A CrossOver A A
A CrossOver A A
A CrossOver A A
A CrossOver A A
= =
= =
= =
= =
 
The corresponding fitness values and reproduction probabilities are: 
4 4 4 4
1 1 1 1
4 4 4 4
2 2 2 2
4 4 4 4
3 3 3 3
4 4 4
4 4 4
0100 ( ) 4.0 ( ) 0.5000 ( ) 0.4407
0100 ( ) 4.0 ( ) 0.5000 ( ) 0.4407
1110 ( ) 7.0 ( ) 0.0345 ( ) 0.0304
1100 ( ) 6.0 ( ) 0.1000
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P A
A g A F A P
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ =
= ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ = ⎯⎯→ 44( ) 0.0881A =
 
After reaching this point, the algorithm could be stopped since the optimum 
value obtained in future generations will, most probably, be unchanged due to the 
high reproduction probability of the fittest chromosome yielding 4x = . Then 
there should not be any reasons to continue the search. However, as opposed to 
this steady state, there might be some points in the algorithm where the search is 
stuck at some not very desirable value. Then, mutations can be initiated into the 
system to avoid these problems. 
It should be noted, that as stated by one of the pioneers of evolutionary 
algorithms, Fogel (1999), GA’s possess further capabilities to solve much more 
complex problems than the one above. He asserts that the ease of their 
implementation and the broad range of areas where they are applicable are very 
valuable characteristics for those who work with very unusual functional forms. 
Usual methods of optimization used in economics generally require functions of 
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continuous, differentiable and, even, convex nature in order to serve their purpose 
properly. However, there are classes of problems which none of these conditions 
might hold. The objective function might be discrete and moreover it might have 
local extrema, rendering some gradient based solutions infeasible. Non-linear 
constraints and non-stationary conditions in real world problems also increase 
computational burden making it difficult to use some of the conventional 
techniques. Genetic algorithms are thus useful in solving complex optimization 
problems with such characteristics without necessitating simplifying assumptions 
about functional forms. 
A GA model is particularly suitable for the problem in this thesis since the 
objective function is discrete and the feasible region is not easy to visualize. Still, 
it is certain that there is some kind of monotonic behavior expected of the 
objective function in response to increases or decreases in pension parameter 
values. So, even though numerous local maxima and minima may be encountered, 
GA developed here must be capable of handling them. 
With its ease of application to economics problems, and its robustness with 
discrete functions, the GA’s have become a useful tool for economists. The 
pioneering work in the field is done by Arifovic (1994) where she simulates 
learning in a rational expectations equilibrium model. In the model, competitive 
firms use a genetic algorithm to update their decision on which and what amount 
of good to use the next period in a one good production economy.  
In another paper, Arifovic (1995) presents a two-period overlapping 
generations (OLG) model with money, low inflation and seignorage to show that 
the individuals’ policies dictated by learning through GA are the same as the ones 
at unique monetary steady state equilibrium.  Bullard and Duffy (1998) extend 
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this model to a multi-period OLG model to find out a high inflation equilibrium, a 
low inflation equilibrium as well as undecided cases. Another application of GA’s 
in economics is the game theoretical solution search where a game is modeled as 
a GA and the possible equilibria are searched for. An example to this application 
is Özyıldırım (1997). The paper approximates solutions to non-linear non-
quadratic open loop Nash-Cournot equilibrium, where agents involved in a multi-
period game creating their own policies about what to do at the beginning of each 
period at time 0 without cooperating with each other. Once the policy is made in 
time 0, the agents stick to their decisions and the game is played accordingly. The 
result is the case where none of the agents can deviate from the equilibrium policy 
without getting worse off.  For a two-person game, the solution starts out by 
creating a GA structure for each player. Each GA structure has the player’s utility 
function, and population. At the beginning, each player sends out a random 
strategy to the other player, which the other player accepts as the best response to 
his action. With the best response at hand, players then move on to create new 
strategies from the acquired best response functions and their previous moves. 
The process works as the initial population is ranked with the help of the 
evaluation function and cross-overs and mutations are performed in the selected 
group. At the end of the selection process, a new strategy is formed and sent to the 
other player, initiating the next round. The algorithm terminates once the 
termination criteria are satisfied. 
In another study, Alemdar and Özyıldırım (1998) use GA’s to search for 
optimal policies in a North/South trading game.   
Another interesting use to GA’s in economics/finance can be found in Chen 
and Yeh (2002) who use GA’s to model agents in a stock market setting through 
 19 
an “agent-based economics” approach which uses GA’s heavily to simulate a real 
life situation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE MODEL 
 
 
 
3.1 The Objective Function 
 
The current Turkish pension system is run on a pay-as-you-go basis which 
finances the payments made to current pensioners through contributions collected 
from current workers. The Social Security Institution therefore needs to bring 
present value of its future receipts as close to the present value of its commitments 
as possible to run the system without significant deficit or surplus. 
In the model, the time horizon is taken to be the period between years 2005 
and 2060, when Turkey’s population is expected to have stabilized and reached its 
steady state at less than 100 million people. Thus, the payments-receipts balance 
achieved by 2060 will represent a reasonable approximation to the SSI’s deficit 
level for 2061 and onwards.  
One way of restoring the long-term actuarial balance of the SSI is to 
minimize the following expression, mostly adapted from Sayan and Turhan-Sayan 
(2001). 
0
20052060
, , , ,
, , 2005
1 ( , , ) ( , , )
1
s.t.                                                                                             
min
t
tt le mwa
t a t a t t a t a t
RR CR A t a A a a
RR rw R RR CR A CR rw W RR CR Aδ
−=
= = =
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑
                                 (1)
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Retirement Age Constraints: 
: 41 ,  : 2005 2060 :ta a A t t∀ ≤ < ∀ ≤ ≤  
, , ,     ( , , )  ( , , ) ( , , )              (2)
o o o o o o o o
a t a t a tW RR CR A W RR CR A R RR CR A= +
 
,              ( , , )  0                                                                            (3)
o o
a tR RR CR A =
  
: 75 ,  : 2005 2060 :ta a A t t∀ ≥ ≥ ∀ ≤ ≤  
, ,     ( , , )  ( , , )                                                (4)
o o o o o
a t a tW RR CR A W RR CR A=
 
, ,              ( , ) ( , , )                                                   (5)
o o o o o
a t a tR RR CR A R RR CR A=
 
Income Elasticity of Labor and Pension Constraints: 
Constraints for policy change in the initial year of the model:  
: ,  : 2005 2060ta A a mwa t t∀ ≤ < ∀ ≤ ≤  
' 2005 ' 2060 2005 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2006 2005 2006     ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = =  
, , ( , , ) ( , , )                                        (6)
o o o o
a t a tW RR CR A DW RR CR A+
 
' 2005 ' 2060 2005 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2006 2005 2006     R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = =  
 
, ,              R ( , , ) ( , , )                                        (7)
o o o o
a t a tRR CR A DW RR CR A−
 
Constraints for policy change for years 2006 through 2059: 
: ,  ,  : 2005 2060,  : 2006 2060ta A a mwa t t tτ τ τ∀ ≤ < ∀ < ≤ ≤ ∀ ≤ ≤  
' ' 2060 ' ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 1 ' 2005 ' 1     ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = + = = + =  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '          ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )                (8)
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = =
' ' 2060 ' ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 1 ' 2005 ' 1     R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = + = = + =  
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' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '          R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )               (9)
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = =
: ,  ,  : 2005 2060,  : 2006 2060ta A a mwa t t tτ τ τ∀ ≤ < ∀ ≥ ≤ ≤ ∀ ≤ ≤  
' ' 2060 ' ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 1 ' 2005 ' 1     ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = + = = + =  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '          ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = = +  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '               ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )      (10)
o o
a tDW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = =
 
' ' 2060 ' ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 1 ' 2005 ' 1             R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = + = = + =  
 
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '          R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = = −  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '               ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )      (11)
o o
a tDW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = =
 
Constraints for the final year of the model: 
: ,  ,  : 2005 2059ta A a mwa t t tτ∀ ≤ < ∀ < ≤ ≤  
,     ( , , )a tW RR CR A =  
' 2059 ' 2060 ' 2059 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2060 ' 2005 ' 2060({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )                  (12)
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = =
 
, ( , , )a tR RR CR A =  
 
' 2059 ' 2060 ' 2059 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2060 ' 2005 ' 2060({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )                  (13)
o o
a tR RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = =
 
: ,  2060ta A a mwa t∀ ≤ < =  
,     ( , , )a tW RR CR A =  
' 2059 ' 2060 ' 2059 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2060 ' 2005 ' 2060     ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = −  
' 2059 ' 2060 ' 2059 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2060 ' 2005 ' 2060               ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )      (14)
o o
a tDW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = =
 
,     R ( , , )a t RR CR A =  
' 2059 ' 2060 ' 2059 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2060 ' 2005 ' 2060     R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = −  
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' 2059 ' 2060 ' 2059 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2060 ' 2005 ' 2060               ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )      (15)
o o
a tDW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = =
 
and 
, , , ,
,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1            , if 0
( ) 2 1 2 1
0                                                                    , else
a t t a t t a t t a t t
a t t t t t
W dCR R dRR W dCR R dRR
DW CR RR CR RR
λ λ λ λ⎧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − + <⎪ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⋅ = − −⎨ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎩  
                                                                                                                            (16)  
where 
tCR    : Average contribution rate per worker in year t ( 10 << tCR ), 
tRR       : Average replacement rate of a pensioner in year t to replace 
average work income ( 10 << tRR ) 
tA         : Minimum retirement age in year t ( mwaAt < ), 
, ,RR CR A          : 2060 2060 20602005 2005 2005{ } ,{ } ,{ }
t t t
t t t t t tRR CR A
= = =
= = =  
,/ ( , , )a tW R RR CR A     : Projected number of workers/pensioners of age a  in 
year t  as a function of pension  parameters in the policy matrix, { , , }RR CR A , 
,/ ( , , )
o o o
a tW R RR CR A : Original projection of number of 
workers/pensioners of age a  in year t  as a function of pre-1999 pension  
parameters, { , , }o o oRR CR A ,  
,/ ( , , )
o o
a tW R RR CR A     : Projection of number of workers/pensioners of age 
a  in year t  updated according to the new value of A only, 
' ' 2060 ' ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 1 ' 2005 ' 1({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = + = = + : A worker 
population matrix showing the steps in transforming the final form of retirement 
age constraint, , ( , , )
o o
a tW RR CR A , to the final elasticity constrained worker 
matrix, , ( , , )a tW RR CR A , where τ  represents the year up to which the 
transformation has successfully been completed.  
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,a trw      : Average real work income of pensioners of age a  in year t ,  
tarw ,      : Average real work income of workers of age a  in year t , 
0a          :Minimum working age, 
le          :Life expectancy. 
λ          :Income elasticity constant, 
ρ          : Pension elasticity constant, 
mwa     : Maximum working age, 
δ          : Discount factor, 
 
 The objective function to be minimized describes the difference between 
the total present discounted values of contribution receipts and pension payments 
to face the SSI over the model horizon, provided that pension parameters are 
{ , , }o o oRR CR A . Total wages earned by the workers covered by the SSI in a given 
year t is calculated by multiplying the number of workers in a given cohort, 
, ( , , )a tW RR CR A , by the average wage of workers belonging to that cohort, ,a trw , 
and then summing the result over all age groups in year t,  
, , ( , , )
le
a t a t
a mwa
rw W RR CR A
=
∑ . Total contribution revenue of the SSI for a given year t 
is calculated by multiplying this sum with the contribution rate for that year, tCR . 
The resulting value is converted to the present value terms by a standard present 
value operator to yield, 
0
2005
, ,
1 ( , , )
1
t mwa
t a t a t
a a
CR rw W RR CR Aδ
−
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ ∑ . Then, the present 
values are summed over for all possible years, to obtain total present value of the 
future receipts of the SSI, 
0
20052060
, ,
2005
1 ( , , )
1
tt mwa
t a t a t
t a a
CR rw W RR CR Aδ
−=
= =
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
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Total present value of the future pension expenditure of the SSI is obtained 
in a similar way resulting in 
20052060
, ,
2005
1 ( , , )
1
t
tt le
t a t a t
t a A
RR rw R RR CR Aδ
−=
= =
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ . 
Therefore, subtracting the expenditures from revenues, we get the present 
value of the total deficit/surplus. Normally, a publicly managed pension fund 
would not aim at high surpluses but would ideally avoid high deficits. Naturally, 
the deficit/surplus value should be as close to zero as possible. This is achieved in 
the model by using the absolute value operator whose global minimum is 
naturally zero. 
 
3.2. The Constraints 
The optimization discussed up to this point requires an extensive knowledge 
of the labor force covered by SSI, which is represented by the following data: 
i. The projections of the number of workers, , ( , , )
o o o
a tW RR CR A ,  for 
each age a ( where a takes integer values 15 through 75 plus) and for each 
year t (where t takes integer values 2005 through 2060),  
ii. The projections of the number of retirees, , ( , , )
o o o
a tR RR CR A , for 
each age a ( where a takes integer values 41 through 80 plus)  and for each 
year t (where t takes integer values 2005 through 2060), 
iii. The projections of the average annual  real work incomes of 
workers, ,a trw ,  for each age a ( where a takes integer values 15 through 75 
plus) and for each year t (where t takes integer values 2005 through 2060),  
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iv. The projections of the average annual  real work incomes of 
retirees, ,a trw , for each cohort a ( where a takes integer values 41 through 
80 plus)  for each year t (where t takes integer values 2005 through 2060), 
where the plus sign following an integer represents the set of all integers 
after that integer. 
Initially, four projection matrices, , ( , , )
o o o
a tW RR CR A , , ( , , )
o o o
a tR RR CR A ,  
,a trw , and , ,a t orw , for items (a) through (d) above are available through ILO 
(1996) and Sayan and Turhan-Sayan (2001). These matrices contain projections 
that are based on pre-1999 values of pension parameters. Therefore, they include 
non-zero values for the number of retirees for all years in the model for ages as 
low as 38. 
The results of our optimization exercises therefore rely heavily on these 
projections but the projected values of gross real wages will assume not to be 
affected by the changes brought forth by alternative reform parameters. 
Such dependence creates the need to update the original projections on the 
numbers of workers and retirees accordingly with the changes in pension 
parameters. This is achieved by using the retirement age and elasticity constraints. 
 
3.2.a Retirement Age Constraint 
The first step in updating projections based on the pre-1999 values of 
pension parameters is the creation of worker/retiree projections in accordance 
with the proposed increases in retirement ages, A. The retirement age vector A is 
designed such that its first element corresponds to the proposed minimum 
retirement age in year 2005, and its second element corresponds to the retirement 
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age in year 2006. Proceeding like this, the last element of the vector would be 
matched with the last year in the model horizon, 2060.  
The elements of this vector take monotonically increasing values since it is 
assumed that age is increased from one year to another, it will not be reduced ever 
again in the future. This is a reasonable assumption since the life expectancy of 
the population is also expected to increase in the future.  
The algorithm starts out from year 2005 which is the first element in A. The 
retirement age is checked and found to be, say, 1a . This means that the retirees 
who are below age 1a  in 2005 will no longer be able to retire as dictated in the 
original retiree matrix and will have to work until the newly posted retirement 
age.  These people are consequently transferred to the labor force, W, increasing 
the number of workers at age 1a in year 2005 by the number of retirees at age 1a in 
the same year. Naturally, this brings down the number of retirees at that age in 
that year strictly to zero. The new labor force values after a proposed 2005 
retirement age policy change are presented below. 
: 41 ,  : 2005 2060 :ta a A t t∀ ≤ < ∀ ≤ ≤  
, , ,     ( , , )  ( , , ) ( , , )            (17)
o o o o o o o o
a t a t a tW RR CR A W RR CR A R RR CR A= +
 
,              ( , , )  0                                                                          (18)
o o
a tR RR CR A =
 
: 75 ,  : 2005 2060 :ta a A t t∀ ≥ ≥ ∀ ≤ ≤  
 
, ,     ( , , )  ( , , )                                              (19)
o o o o o
a t a tW RR CR A W RR CR A=
 
, ,     ( , , )  R ( , , )                                              (20)
o o o o o
a t a tR RR CR A RR CR A=
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Repeating the same steps for retirement ages for years 2006 to 2060 yields 
the new worker and retiree projections, , ( , , )
o o
a tW RR CR A  and , ( , , )
o o
a tR RR CR A . 
The following pictorial aid depicting the process might be helpful. 
MRA 42 43 43 45 48 51 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Retirees 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
41                         
42                         
43                         
44                         
45                         
46                         
47                         
48                         
49                         
50                         
51                         
52                         
53                         
54                         
55                         
56                         
             
Legend:   
Retirees transferred to the labor force, number of retirees in light gray areas are reduced to 
zero. 
   The original retiree projections are kept.      
             
MRA 42 43 43 45 48 51 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Workers 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
35                         
36                         
37                         
38                         
39                         
40                         
41                         
42                         
43                         
44                         
45                         
46                         
47                         
48                         
49                         
50                         
51                         
52                         
53                         
54                         
55                         
56                         
             
Legend:
    
Original worker projections plus retirees transferred to the labor force from light gray area in 
the retiree matrix. 
   
The original worker projections are 
kept.      
 
Figure 3: Retirement Age Constraint Pictorial Aid 
 
 
 29 
Furthermore, a flowchart sketching the algorithm is shown below. 
                    
Figure 4: Retirement Age Constraint Implementation Algorithm 
  
 The matrices updated to take the retirement age constraint into account are 
used in calculating the additional changes to result from changes in CR and RR.  
 
Is the current year in the model horizon?
YES NO
Is the proposed retirement age in this 
year greater than 41? 
YES NO
Increase the current year by 1. 
Move all retirees belonging to 
that year and age to the 
corresponding workers matrix. 
Decrease the current 
retirement age by year by 1.
Terminate 
Set year to 
2005, the initial 
year in the 
model horizon. 
Get the current year’s 
minimum retirement age 
from the proposed policy 
vector.
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3.2.b Work and Pension Income Elasticities of Labor Supply 
Constraints 
In the model, the disposable income of a worker is calculated by multiplying 
the real annual wage income of the worker by (1-CR), the percentage of income 
received by the worker net of contributions paid to the SSI. That is 
,(1 )t a tI CR rw= − .  
Similarly, the pension income is calculated by multiplying the average real 
annual wage income of the pensioner over the working period by RR, the 
replacement rate: ,t a tP RR rw= . 
In the light of these definitions, we can consider the response of individuals 
who are between the statutory entitlement age and maximum working age to 
changes in CR and/or RR. Since these individuals have the option of continuing to 
work or taking their retirement depending upon the incentives, changes in CR and 
RR would affect the worker-retiree composition of this age group. 
Now, let λ be the income elasticity of labor supply. Then, 
,
,
,
,
( )
( )
                                                                                                               (21)
a t
a t
a t
a t
dW
W
dWI
WI
λ
⋅
⋅=
 
where work income is , ,(1 )a t t a tWI CR rw= −  and tA a mwa≤ ≤ . Naturally, 
0λ > , and its definition can be rearranged to yield , ,
, ,
( ) ( )a t a t
a t a t
dW W
dWI WI
λ⋅ ⋅= . 
Note that  
, ,
, ,
( ) ( )a t a t t
a t t a t
dW dW dCR
dWI dCR dWI
⋅ ⋅≡  
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,
,
( )
                          
                 
a t t
a t t
dW dCR
dWI dCR
⋅≡  
,
,
( )
                                                                                                  (22)a t t
a t
dW dCR
rw
⋅≡ −
Combining this with (21), we can write  
, , , ,
,
( ) ( ) ( )
                                                            (23)
(1 )
a t a t a t a t
t a t t
dW W rw W
dCR WI CR
λ λ⋅ ⋅ ⋅= − = − −
 
, ,( ) ( )                                                                                      (24)
(1 )
a t a t
t t
dW W
dCR CR
λ⋅ ⋅= = −−
 
Equation 24 enabled us to convert income elasticity of labor supply into a 
contribution rate elasticity. This equation could alternatively be written as  
, 1 , 1
,
( ) ( )
                                                                    (25)
( ) (1 )
a t a t t t
a t t
W W CR CR
W CR
λ+ +⋅ − ⋅ −= −⋅ −
 
with discrete changes in percentage terms on both sides, allowing us to interpret λ 
as net wage elasticity of labor supply. Corresponding to λ is an RR elasticity that 
allows us to capture the response of individuals aged a  at time t to changes in RR. 
Let this elasticity be denoted by ρ and defined as  
,
,
,
,
( )
( )
                                                                                                        (26)
a t
a t
a t
a t
dR
R
dPI
PI
ρ
⋅
⋅=
 
where  ,t t a tPI RR rw=  and 0ρ > . Then,  
,, ,
,, ,
( )
                                                                      (27)
( )
a ta t a t t
a ta t a t t
dR dPI dRR rw
R PI RR rw
ρ ρ⋅ = =⋅
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Thus, ρ shows the percentage change in the number of retiree resulting from a 
one percent increase in the replacement rate. Equation 27 can be equivalently 
written as 
, 1 , 1
,
( ) ( )
                                                                     (28)
( ) (1 )
a t a t t t
a t t
R R RR RR
R RR
ρ+ +⋅ − ⋅ −= −⋅ −
 
Now, remembering that the population, ,a tp , for any particular year and age is 
constant regardless of the policy changes,  , , ,( ) ( )  a t a t a tR W p⋅ + ⋅ =  
, , ,( ) ( )                                                                                    (29)a t a t a t
t t t
dW dp dR
dRR dRR dRR
⋅ ⋅= −
 
Since ,a tp  is constant, we can write the following by keeping Equation 27 in 
mind. 
, ,( ) ( )    a t a t
t t
dW dR
dRR dRR
⋅ ⋅= −  
, ( )                                                                                                        (30)a t
t
R
RR
ρ ⋅= −
 
Equation 24 and Equation 30 together imply 
, ,
,
( ) ( )
2 ( )
1
a t t a t t
a t
t t
W dCR R dRR
dW
CR RR
λ ρ⋅ ⋅⎡ ⎤⋅ = − +⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
 
or 
, ,
,
( ) ( )1( )                                                     (31) 
2 1
a t t a t t
a t
t t
W dCR R dRR
dW
CR RR
λ ρ⋅ ⋅⎡ ⎤⋅ = − +⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
 
in which ,a tdW  may be positive or negative depending on the magnitudes of 
changes in CR and RR.  
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However, it should be noted that the changes that demand an increase in the 
number of workers (such as a reduction in CR) while keeping the registered 
population constant cannot be met.  This is because the retirees who by definition 
have quit contributing to the system cannot be returned to the workforce. Then, 
increasing the number of workers without reducing the number of retirees would 
require increasing the projected number of people within the age group under 
consideration. Hence, we assume that transfers from projected workforce matrices 
to the projected retiree matrices are unidirectional in the sense that only workers 
can be transferred to the retiree matrices. Then, the change in the number of 
workers for any change in CR and RR would be 
, ,
,
( )                    , if ( ) 0
( )                                                                   (32)
0                              , else
a t a t
a t
dW dW
DW
⋅ ⋅ <⎧⋅ = ⎨⎩
 
 Projected numbers of workers and retirees are updated in response to 
changes in CR and RR as follows:  
Initially, the worker and retiree projections that are based on the current 
values of contribution and replacement rates are manipulated to address minimum 
retirement age changes. From now on, the resulting matrices will be referred to as  
, ( , , ) 
o o
a tW RR CR A and , ( , , ) 
o o
a tR RR CR A , where the replacement of 
oA  by A 
indicates that minimum retirement age modification is already completed on the 
matrix, whereas keeping oRR  and oCR  indicates that no modifications on account 
of changes in CR and RR have been introduced to matrices yet.  
Once a change is introduced to the contribution and replacement rates in the 
first year of the model, 2005, the worker retiree matrices must be adjusted so as to 
obtain new matrices based on the new contribution and replacement rates for the 
year 2005. That is, ' 2005 ' 2060 ' 2005 ' 2060, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2006 ' 2005 ' 2006({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = and 
 34 
' 2005 ' 2060 ' 2005 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2006 ' 2005 ' 2006({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tR RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = . This is achieved by 
applying the elasticity formula above to transfer some of the workers projected to 
stay in the workforce under old values of CR and RR to the projected retiree 
population for all of the remaining years in the model. After making the necessary 
worker transfers, the transferred workers are subtracted from the retiree matrix to 
keep the population constant. 
: ,  : 2005 2060ta A a mwa t t∀ ≤ < ∀ ≤ ≤  
' 2005 ' 2060 2005 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2006 2005 2006     ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = =  
, ,              W ( , , ) ( , , )                                              (33)
o o o o
a t a tRR CR A DW RR CR A+
 
' 2005 ' 2060 2005 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2006 2005 2006     R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = =  
 
, ,              R ( , , ) ( , , )                                              (34)
o o o o
a t a tRR CR A DW RR CR A+
 
As a consequence, the change injected into the worker retiree projections 
becomes a once-and-for-all change affecting all present and future numbers of 
retirees. 
Once the data is updated like this, the next year’s projections, 
' 2006 ' 2060 2006 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2007 2005 2007({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tR RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = and 
' 2006 ' 2060 2006 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 2007 2005 2007({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = = = , will be created similarly 
whenever there is a change in the policy. In general, for an arbitrary year τ in the 
horizon, in the case of a policy change, relevant projections are updated as 
follows. First of all, the process starts out by noting that current and future 
policies cannot affect the number of workers and retirees projected for the 
previous years. Hence, these values become natural elements of current matrices. 
Then, the change in current policy variables is applied to every age group in every 
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year for the remaining years in the horizon to update the matrices in accordance 
with the policy changes. The algorithm thus moves forward to cover all years in 
the model horizon. A general approach is presented below. 
: ,  ,  : 2005 2060,  : 2006 2060ta A a mwa t t tτ τ τ∀ ≤ < ∀ < ≤ ≤ ∀ ≤ ≤  
' ' 2060 ' ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 1 ' 2005 ' 1     ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = + = = + =  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '          ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )                       (35)
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = =
 
: ,  ,  : 2005 2060,  : 2006 2060ta A a mwa t t tτ τ τ∀ ≤ < ∀ ≥ ≤ ≤ ∀ ≤ ≤  
' ' 2060 ' ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 1 ' 2005 ' 1({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = + = = + =  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '      ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = = +  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '          ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )           (36)
o o
a tDW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = =
 
: ,  ,  : 2005 2060,  : 2006 2060ta A a mwa t t tτ τ τ∀ ≤ < ∀ < ≤ ≤ ∀ ≤ ≤  
' ' 2060 ' ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 1 ' 2005 ' 1     R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = + = = + =  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '          R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )                  (37)
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = =
 
: ,  ,  : 2005 2060,  : 2006 2060ta A a mwa t t tτ τ τ∀ ≤ < ∀ ≥ ≤ ≤ ∀ ≤ ≤  
' ' 2060 ' ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' 1 ' 2005 ' 1({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a tR RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= = = =
= = + = = + =  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '      R ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )
o o
a t RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = = −  
' 1 ' 2060 ' 1 ' 2060
, ' ' 2005 ' ' ' 2005 '          ({ } ,{ } ,{ } ,{ } , )           (38)
o o
a tDW RR RR CR CR A
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= − = = − =
= = = =
 
 The data for the final year of the model horizon can also be calculated 
from the previous year’s data in a similar way. 
 Following is the algorithm for implementing the elasticity constraints. 
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Figure 5: Elasticity Constraints Implementation Algorithm 
 
 
Is the current year in the model horizon?
YES NO
Do the proposed RR, CR values differ 
from the previous year? 
YES NO
Increase the current year by 1. 
Does the overall movement 
labor force, calculated with the 
help of elasticities, tend to 
increase the number of retirees? 
YES 
Update the worker and retiree 
matrices for all ages common to 
these matrices for the remaining 
years in the model horizon. 
Terminate 
Set year to 
2005, the initial 
year in the 
model horizon. 
From the retirement 
age constraint 
NO
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 The program that translates the effects of changes in the minimum 
retirement age and contribution/replacement rates into the model becomes a part 
of the fitness calculating code to order the chromosomes according to their 
usefulness. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
  
The aim of this section is to compare results obtained with the GA to the 
baseline scenarios of the 1999 Act and its 2002 modification required by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court as well as the current social security proposal reform 
bill expected to be legislated in 2006. 
In the rest of the chapter, the constants used in the optimization program 
take the following values. The labor elasticity of income and pension are taken to 
be 0.2, while the discount factor is 0.05. Also, for any further inquiries about the 
code used in optimization, the MATLAB code written for the solution of the 
problem is presented in the Appendix. 
First of all, the parametric adjustments in 1999, 2002, and 2006 (expected) 
are given below. 
Table 1: Parametric Adjustments in 1999, 2002, and 2006 (Expected) 
 1999 2002 2006 Proposal 
Year 
Min. Ret. 
Age RR CR 
Min Ret. 
Age RR CR 
Min. Ret. 
Age RR CR 
2005 48 0.65 0.20 41 0.65 0.20 41 0.65 0.20 
2006 49 0.65 0.20 42 0.65 0.20 42 0.625 0.20 
2007 50 0.65 0.20 43 0.65 0.20 43 0.625 0.20 
2008 51 0.65 0.20 44 0.65 0.20 44 0.625 0.20 
2009 58 0.65 0.20 45 0.65 0.20 45 0.625 0.20 
2010 58 0.65 0.20 46 0.65 0.20 46 0.625 0.20 
2011 58 0.65 0.20 47 0.65 0.20 47 0.625 0.20 
2012 58 0.65 0.20 48 0.65 0.20 48 0.625 0.20 
2013 58 0.65 0.20 49 0.65 0.20 49 0.625 0.20 
2014 58 0.65 0.20 50 0.65 0.20 50 0.625 0.20 
2015 58 0.65 0.20 51 0.65 0.20 51 0.625 0.20 
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   Table 1: Cont’d     
2016 58 0.65 0.20 52 0.65 0.20 52 0.625 0.20 
2017 58 0.65 0.20 53 0.65 0.20 53 0.50 0.20 
2020 58 0.65 0.20 56 0.65 0.20 56 0.50 0.20 
2021-2060 58 0.65 0.20 58 0.65 0.20 58 0.50 0.20 
 
Calculations based on these parameter specifications yield the following 
accumulated deficits for the model duration. 
 
Figure 6: Accumulated Deficit under Parametric Adjustment attempts 
 
The scenarios considered here are as follows.  
 
4.1 Scenario 1 
 
In this exercise, the three components of the policy reform are subjected to 
change in five to ten year intervals. 
The minimum retirement age structure is kept in accordance with the 2002 
adjustment until year 2020, and then gradual increases in the minimum retirement 
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age are allowed for every 5-year period. The changes are generally binary choices 
leading the program to make a choice between two consecutive retirement ages 
until year 2050, after which interval is considered for possible increases in the 
minimum retirement age. Finally, the 2055 policy change allows the computer to 
make a choice between age 65 and 66 to decide on the final retirement age in the 
model. The difference from the current proposal lies in its flexibility to allow 65, 
a lower value than the current proposal’s 66 to be the minimum retirement age in 
2060. Furthermore, the increases in retirement ages span 5 year terms to bring the 
policy change years approximately in the middle of two consecutive elections to 
avoid any populist moves.  
The RR and CR values are allowed to float in the region 0.65 to 0.725 for 
RR and 0.20 to 0.275 for CR. The policy change occurs in every 10 years to 
accommodate changes in the age structure to reach the optimum long-run deficit 
values. The policy change years are also selected to be in the middle of two 
consecutive elections to avoid any populist moves. 
The allowed ranges of pension parameters and the GA output are presented 
below in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Policy Proposal and the GA Output for Scenario 1 
  Allowed Ranges of Pension Parameters   Results  
Year min MRA 
max 
MRA 
Bit 
Depth 
min. 
RR 
max. 
RR 
Bit 
Depth CR 
max. 
CR 
Bit 
Depth MRA RR CR 
2005 41 41 0 0.65 0.725 4 0.2 0.275 4 41 0.65 0.245 
2006 42 42 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 42 0.65 0.245 
2007 43 43 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 43 0.65 0.245 
2008 44 44 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 44 0.65 0.245 
2009 45 45 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 45 0.65 0.245 
2010 46 46 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 46 0.65 0.245 
2011 47 47 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 47 0.65 0.245 
2012 48 48 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 48 0.65 0.245 
2013 49 49 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 49 0.65 0.245 
2014 50 50 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 50 0.65 0.245 
2015 51 51 0 0.65 0.725 4 0.2 0.275 4 51 0.655 0.27 
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Table 2: Con’t 
2016 52 52 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 52 0.655 0.27 
2017 53 53 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 53 0.655 0.27 
2018 54 54 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 54 0.655 0.27 
2019 55 55 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 55 0.655 0.27 
2020 56 56 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 56 0.655 0.27 
2021 56 56 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 56 0.655 0.27 
2022 56 56 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 56 0.655 0.27 
2023 56 56 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 56 0.655 0.27 
2024 56 56 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 56 0.655 0.27 
2025 57 58 1 0.65 0.725 4 0.2 0.275 4 58 0.66 0.265 
2026 57 58 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.66 0.265 
2027 57 58 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.66 0.265 
2028 57 58 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.66 0.265 
2029 57 58 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.66 0.265 
2030 58 59 1 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.66 0.265 
2031 58 59 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.66 0.265 
2032 58 59 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.66 0.265 
2033 58 59 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.66 0.265 
2034 58 59 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.66 0.265 
2035 59 60 1 0.65 0.725 4 0.2 0.275 4 59 0.69 0.275 
2036 59 60 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.69 0.275 
2037 59 60 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.69 0.275 
2038 59 60 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.69 0.275 
2039 59 60 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.69 0.275 
2040 59 60 1 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 60 0.69 0.275 
2041 60 61 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 60 0.69 0.275 
2042 60 61 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 60 0.69 0.275 
2043 60 61 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 60 0.69 0.275 
2044 60 61 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 60 0.69 0.275 
2045 61 62 1 0.65 0.725 4 0.2 0.275 4 61 0.67 0.275 
2046 61 62 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 61 0.67 0.275 
2047 61 62 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 61 0.67 0.275 
2048 61 62 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 61 0.67 0.275 
2049 61 62 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 61 0.67 0.275 
2050 62 65 2 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.67 0.275 
2051 62 65 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.67 0.275 
2052 62 65 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.67 0.275 
2053 62 65 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.67 0.275 
2054 62 65 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.67 0.275 
2055 65 66 1 0.65 0.725 4 0.2 0.275 4 66 0.66 0.275 
2056 65 66 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.66 0.275 
2057 65 66 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.66 0.275 
2058 65 66 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.66 0.275 
2059 65 66 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.66 0.275 
2060 65 66 » 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.66 0.275 
  
First of all, the objective function value is effectively zero for this case, 
implying a well balanced long term accumulated difference between pension 
expenditures and revenues, as seen in the related graph. Moreover, the results 
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show that the minimum retirement ages in the solution increase gradually over the 
whole model horizon except for the sudden four year increase to be faced in 2050. 
The replacement rate shows a gradual and steady increase, from 0.65 to 0.69, 
approximately until the midpoint in the model horizon, 2030, followed by a 
similar decrease over the model horizon from 0.72 to 0.66, which is 
approximately the current value. The contribution rate also increases to an almost 
constant 50-year value of 0.275 after staying at 0.245 in the first ten years of the 
model horizon. 
As can be seen from the yearly deficit graph, the minimum retirement age 
increase in 2050, combined with the 2045 decrease in RR brings the deficit level 
of SSI to the optimal value, approximately zero, in the long run. Figure 7 below 
shows the progression of accumulated deficit through the years. 
 
 
Figure 7: Accumulated Deficit for Scenario 1 
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An advantage of this scenario is its ability to keep replacement rates rather 
stable in the long run. Retirees registered to SSI almost always receive the same 
replacement rates without sudden drops.  
A disadvantage of this proposal over the current proposal is its low RR over 
CR ratio in its final years. Scenario 1 has a RR over CR ratio of 2.4, whereas the 
current proposal’s RR over CR ratio is 2.5.  
  
 
Figure 8: Yearly Surplus and Deficit for Scenario 1 
 
Another disadvantage of this scenario is that it has very high surplus values 
at the end of the model horizon to balance the long run SSI deficits as shown 
above in Figure 8. However, these surpluses at the end of the model horizon will 
almost certainly continue to stay the same after the model horizon. Since the 
Turkish population was expected to reach its steady state after 2060, these 
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surpluses will create large amounts of accumulated funds to be used elsewhere 
after 2060.    
The improvement in the fitness value can be viewed in Figure 9 where the 
fitness shows a slow but steady increase in the first generations to face sudden 
improvement between generations 10 and 15. The fitness values are then almost 
constant in the last generations implying hinting a good solution.  
 
 
Figure 9: Fitness Values through Generations in Scenario 1 
  
4.2 Scenario 2 
In this exercise, the age structure of the current proposal will be conserved 
while allowing changes in RR and CR within the ranges of 0.65-0.725 and 0.2- 
0.275, respectively in years 2005, 2020, and 2040. 20 years is picked as a period 
of reasonable  length with the intention of reflecting the effects of basic 
demographic changes in the workforce. The policy change years are projected to 
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be between elections as in the previous scenario. The allowed ranges of pension 
parameters are presented below in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Allowed Ranges and the GA Output for Scenario 1 
  Allowed Ranges of Pension Parameters  Results 
Year min MRA 
max 
MRA 
Bit 
Depth 
min. 
RR 
max. 
RR 
Bit 
Depth CR 
max. 
CR 
Bit 
Depth MRA RR CR 
2005 41 41 0 0.65 0.725 4 0.2 0.275 4 41 0.675 0.255 
2006 42 42 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 42 0.675 0.255 
2007 43 43 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 43 0.675 0.255 
2008 44 44 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 44 0.675 0.255 
2009 45 45 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 45 0.675 0.255 
2010 46 46 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 46 0.675 0.255 
2011 47 47 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 47 0.675 0.255 
2012 48 48 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 48 0.675 0.255 
2013 49 49 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 49 0.675 0.255 
2014 50 50 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 50 0.675 0.255 
2015 51 51 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 51 0.675 0.255 
2016 52 52 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 52 0.675 0.255 
2017 53 53 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 53 0.675 0.255 
2018 54 54 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 54 0.675 0.255 
2019 55 55 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 55 0.675 0.255 
2020 56 56 0 0.65 0.725 4 0.2 0.275 4 56 0.65 0.24 
2021 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2022 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2023 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2024 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2025 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2026 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2027 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2028 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2029 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2030 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.265 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2031 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2032 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2033 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2034 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2035 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 58 0.65 0.24 
2036 59 59 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 59 0.65 0.24 
2037 60 60 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 60 0.65 0.24 
2038 60 60 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 60 0.65 0.24 
2039 60 60 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 60 0.65 0.24 
2040 61 61 0 0.65 0.725 4 0.2 0.265 4 61 0.695 0.27 
2041 61 61 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 61 0.695 0.27 
2042 62 62 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 62 0.695 0.27 
2043 62 62 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 62 0.695 0.27 
2044 63 63 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 63 0.695 0.27 
2045 63 63 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 63 0.695 0.27 
2046 64 64 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 64 0.695 0.27 
2047 64 64 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 64 0.695 0.27 
2048 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.695 0.27 
2049 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.695 0.27 
2050 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.695 0.27 
2051 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.695 0.27 
2052 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.695 0.27 
2053 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.695 0.27 
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Table 3: Con’t 
2054 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 65 0.695 0.27 
2055 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.695 0.27 
2056 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.695 0.27 
2057 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.695 0.27 
2058 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.695 0.27 
2059 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.695 0.27 
2060 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 » 0.2 0.275 » 66 0.695 0.27 
 
Once again, the accumulated deficit is very close to zero as shown in Figure 
10 below and the result is optimal in this sense.  
 
 
Figure 10: Accumulated Deficit for Scenario 2 
 
One is tempted to interpret the results in this exercise as a balancing act if 
one especially notes that the values of RR and CR over the years show a positive 
correlation. In the 2005-2020 period RR and CR figures are respectively 0.675 
and 0.255, whereas in the following period, 2021-2040, both values decrease to 
0.65 and 0.24. Furthermore, in the next period, the values of both parameters 
increase again staying a few points above their initial values. Initially, this co-
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movement might seem as a yearly deficit balancing act, since it is reasonable to 
think that when RR (liabilities) decreases, CR (assets) should also decrease. 
However true, this is not the force that drives the system to balance. If it were, 
observing an increase in deficit for the 2005-2020 period with the RR-CR pair 
0.675 and 0.255, should project the same increase in deficit for the 2005-2020 
period with nearly the same RR-CR pair 0.695 and 0.27. Interestingly, the 
opposite is the case. The 0.695-0.27 pair provides the upward thrust in the 
balances for the next 20 years due to the resulting change in the worker-retiree 
composition over the years.  
Figure 11 below shows the yearly progress of total number of workers and 
retirees across all ages in the original and policy induced worker/retiree matrices. 
 
 
Figure 11: Original and Policy Induced Workforce Projections 
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The upward thrust in balances after 2040 is created by the change in the 
demographics of workforce. Therefore, in this solution, the 20-year periods reflect 
the general demographic trends in the sense that numerical increases in the 
workforce creates the fund necessary to sustain the previous periods’ RR/CR 
ratios without necessarily decreasing this ratio drastically. 
 
Figure 12: Yearly Surplus and Deficit for Scenario 2 
 
Unfortunately, this scenario also has the same problem with the previous 
one in the sense that it has high surplus value at the end of the model horizon as 
shown in the above Figure 12. Moreover, another disadvantage of this scenario is 
its vulnerability to manipulation by the workers. The policy change in year 2040 
provides incentive for many workers to retire in that year after paying low levels 
of contribution rates (0.24 instead of 0.27 after 2040) to receive higher levels of 
replacement rates (0.695 instead of 0.65 before 2040). Therefore, this scenario 
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could cause significant changes in worker-retiree composition in the year 2040, 
should it be preannounced. 
The progression of fitness values can be found in Figure 13 below. 
 
Figure 13: Fitness Values through Generations in Scenario 2 
 
 
In this case the best fitness value found in the first few generations did not 
undergo any changes and stayed constant in the following generations.  
 
4.3 Elasticity Sensitivity Analysis for Scenarios 
 
Sensitivity analyses of results were made by considering alternative values 
of elasticity constants. For this purpose, the constants were increased by 50%  and 
decreased by 50% to accommodate possible errors in elasticity measurements. 
The result for Scenario 1 is presented in Figure 14.   
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The figure shows that the changes in elasticity values do not cause drastic 
changes in the accumulated deficit. The deficit increases as the elasticity constants 
increase due to the fact that higher values of elasticity constants would facilitate 
early retirement, leading to increasing expenditure and decreasing revenue for the 
SSI. The deficit decreases, on the other hand, led to the opposite result by 
partially restricting the early retirement process.  
 
 
Figure 14: Elasticity Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 1 
 
The results for Scenario 2 is presented in Figure 15.  
As in Scenario 1, the figure shows that the elasticity changes do not cause 
drastic changes in the accumulated deficit for Scenario 2. The deficit 
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increases/decreases as the elasticity constants increase/decrease as discussed for 
Scenario 1. 
 
Figure 15: Elasticity Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 2 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that results from both scenarios are robust to 
changes in elasticities by as much as 50%. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 This thesis aimed to discuss a more realistic way of modeling parametric 
pension reform alternatives in Turkey by extending the Sayan and Turhan-Sayan 
(2001) article to model the effects of replacement and contribution rate changes 
with work and pension income elasticities of labor supply.  Moreover, policy 
scenario options not available in the Sayan and Turhan-Sayan model, such as 
multiple time slots for changes in replacement and contribution rates were added 
to the GA program to provide greater flexibility to policy makers in designing a 
long term parametric reform. 
The first scenario was designed to allow changes in the minimum retirement 
age in every five years, and changes in CR and RR every ten years. This scenario 
yielded a gradual and steady increase in minimum retirement age, combined with 
higher replacement rate values as well as higher contribution rates relative to the 
current proposal. As expected, the accumulated deficit turned out to be zero. 
However, this scenario produced large surpluses in the final years of the model 
horizon, and had a lower RR/CR ratio than the current one. 
The second scenario was designed to create policy changes in every twenty 
years for CR and RR while keeping the MRA structure of the current proposal. 
The aim of considering twenty year intervals for policy changes was to adjust 
parameters along with changes in demographics over the model horizon. Again, 
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as expected, the scenario had almost zero accumulated deficit. Furthermore, it had 
a higher RR/CR ratio than the current proposal. Yet, high surpluses in the final 
years remained. Under this scenario, the deficit turned out to improve mostly due 
to the significant changes in worker retiree populations. 
Sensitivity analyses were made on accumulated deficits by changing the 
elasticity constants. A 50% change in both directions caused minimal changes in 
accumulated deficits, indicating that both scenarios were robust to ±50% changes 
in elasticities.   
 Further possible extensions to the model include modeling time-varying 
elasticity constants to consider effects of possible external shocks or behavioral 
changes due to varying economic circumstances. 
The scenarios considered in this thesis make up only a small fraction of the 
possible scenarios that can be evaluated with the help of the GA developed here.  
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APPENDIX  
 
 
A.1 The Main GA Program (mainga) 
 
% Genetic Algorithms Program for Social Security Forecast 
%by M. Artun Alparslan 
  
clear all;  
  
%Clears variables in the workspace to avoid confusion and possible indexing 
%errors. 
  
load('original data wspace.mat'); 
  
%Loads original wage (wpay), average wage (wpayavg), retiree population 
%(rat), and worker population (wat) matrices. 
  
question=[2000 2002 38 38 1 0.65 0.65 0 0.20 0.20 0; 
2003 2003 39 39 0 0.65 0.65 1 0.20 0.20 0; 
2004 2004 40 40 0 0.65 0.65 2 0.20 0.20 0; 
2005 2005 41 41 0 0.65 0.725 4 0.20 0.275 4; 
2006 2006 42 42 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2007 2007 43 43 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2008 2008 44 44 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2009 2009 45 45 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2010 2010 46 46 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2011 2011 47 47 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2012 2012 48 48 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2013 2013 49 49 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2014 2014 50 50 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2015 2015 51 51 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2016 2016 52 52 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2017 2017 53 53 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2018 2018 54 54 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2019 2019 55 55 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2020 2020 56 56 0 0.65 0.725 4 0.20 0.275 4; 
2021 2021 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2022 2022 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2023 2023 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2024 2024 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2025 2025 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
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2026 2026 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2027 2027 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2028 2028 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2029 2029 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2030 2030 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2031 2031 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2032 2032 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2033 2033 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2034 2034 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2035 2035 58 58 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2036 2036 59 59 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2037 2037 60 60 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2038 2038 60 60 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2039 2039 60 60 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2040 2040 61 61 0 0.65 0.725 4 0.20 0.275 4; 
2041 2041 61 61 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2042 2042 62 62 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2043 2043 62 62 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2044 2044 63 63 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2045 2045 63 63 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2046 2046 64 64 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2047 2047 64 64 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2048 2048 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2049 2049 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2050 2050 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2051 2051 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2052 2052 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2053 2053 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2054 2054 65 65 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2055 2055 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2056 2056 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2057 2057 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2058 2058 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2059 2059 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf; 
2060 2060 66 66 0 0.65 0.725 inf 0.20 0.275 inf;] 
  
%Optimization problem to be solved is entered to the program through a 
%matrix named "question". "question" is an n by 11 matrix where n is the 
%number of time-slots. A single timeslot question vector consists of the 
%following elements. 
  
%question=[initial year, final year, min retirement age, max retirement  
%age, retirement-bit-depth min RR, max RR, RR-bit-depth, min CR, max CR,  
%CR-bit-depth ] 
  
%Initial Year specifies the initial year of the time slot discussed. 
  
%Final Year specifies the final year of the time slot discussed and it 
%should always be one less than the next slot's "initial year" unless the 
%time slot is the last time slot. 
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%Min Retirement Age, Min RR, and Min CR show the minimum values the 
%corresponding variables can take in the given time slot. 
  
%Max Retirement Age, Max RR, and Max CR show the maximum values the 
%corresponding variables can take in the given time slot. 
  
%Retirement Age Bit-Depth, RR Bit-Depth, and CR Bit-Depth show the  
%bit-depth for variables in a given time slot. A bit depth of zero shows 
%that the variable is constant and takes the value of the corresponding 
%variable in its time-slot.  A bit depth of "inf" ("inf" was used here 
%solely because of its nice properties in MATLAB such as being recognized 
%by an if clause) implies that the variable is again constant but takes the 
%value of previous time-slot. This helps in creating overlapping policies. 
  
%A policy matrix is a 3 by 61 matrix where column carries the Retirement 
%Age, RR, and CR information in its rows for all years in the horizon. 
  
  
popsize = input('Population size: ');  
  
%Enter population size 
  
  
delta= input('Discounting Factor');    
  
%Enter discounting factor 
  
wage_elasticity=0.2; 
pension_elasticity=0.2;  
mutation_probability=0.07; 
  
%Wage and Pension Elasticity constants along with mutation probability in  
%a chromosome is chosen. 
  
chromosome_size=0; 
  
%Chromosome size for particular question ( for initiation) 
  
  
index=[5,8,11]; 
  
%Indices of Bit-Depth variables (Retirement Age, RR, and CR respectively)to 
%calculate chromosome size. 
  
for i=1:size(question,1) 
    for ind=1:3 %yas,rr,cr 
        if question(i,index(ind))~=inf 
           chromosome_size=chromosome_size+question(i,index(ind)); 
        end 
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    end 
end 
chromosome_size 
  
%Every bit depth index in the given "question" matrix is traversed to sum   
%their values to find the chromosome_size. "Inf"'s are treated as zeros 
%naturally. 
  
first_generation= ceil(rand(popsize, chromosome_size)-0.5); 
  
%The first generation of pop_size chromosomes are created. Rand returns 
%values between zero and one. Therefore, subtracting 0.5 and rounding up to 
%the nearest greatest integer yields a chromosome made of zeros and ones. 
  
  
for turns=1:20 
     
    %Number of Turns is set to twenty. 
     
    for pop=1:popsize 
         
        %For all chromosomes in the population... 
            whereAmI=1; 
         
            %Sets a place marker at the first bit of the chromosome.  
         
        for i=1:size(question,1) 
             
            %and for all time slots in the given chromosome... 
             
            for ind=1:3 %yas,rr,cr 
                 
            % Bit-Depths of Retirement Age, RR, and CR are transversed... 
                 
                if question(i,index(ind))==0 
                    for j=question(i,1):question(i,2) 
                        policy(ind,j-1999)=question(i,index(ind)-2); 
                    end 
                     
                    %if the index is found to be zero the variable is 
                    %constant, thus copied to the its corresponding place  
                    %in the policy matrix.   
                 
                elseif question(i,index(ind))==inf 
                    for j=question(i,1):question(i,2) 
                        policy(ind,j-1999)=policy(ind,j-2000); 
                    end    
                     
                    %if the index is found to be "inf" the variable is 
                    %the same as the variable in the previous time slot.  
 60 
                    %That value is copied to its corresponding place  
                    %in the policy matrix.   
                 
                else 
                     
                    %if the index is found to be a counting number, 
                    %then it means that we have encountered a part of the 
                    %chromosome. We evaluate the policy value induced by  
                    %this part of the chromosome in the policy by... 
                     
                    for k=1:question(i,index(ind)) 
                        powerarray(k)=2^(k-1); 
                    end 
                     
                    %Learning its bit-depth from the current question 
                    %matrix and then calculating the powers of 2 for the  
                    %length of this bit-depth.  
                     
                    for j=question(i,1):question(i,2) 
                        policy(ind,j-1999)=first_generation(pop,whereAmI: 
                        whereAmI-1+question(i,index(ind)))*powerarray'* 
                        ((question(i,index(ind)-1)-question(i,index(ind)-2) 
                        )/(2^question(i,index(ind))-1))+question 
                        (i,index(ind)-2); 
                    end 
                     
                    %For each year in the time slot, policy variable is 
                    %calculated using the powers of two and the 
                    %corresponding bit values in the chromosome. The basic 
                    %idea is adding the minimum policy value (question 
                    %(i,index(ind)-2)) to the calculated step size  
                    %((question(i,index(ind)-1)-question(i,index(ind)-2))/ 
                    %(2^question(i,index(ind))-1)) times the modulo 2 value 
                    %of the chosen part of the chromosome. 
                     
                    whereAmI=whereAmI+question(i,index(ind)); 
                     
                    %Place marker is set to the beginning the next part of 
                    %the chromosome to be evaluated  
                     
                    powerarray=0; 
                     
                    %Powers of two function is nulled until the next call. 
                     
                end 
            end 
        end 
         
        %Thus any arbitrary chromosome is changed into a policy  
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        newwatrat; 
         
        %Each policy creates its own wat-rat table for evaluating its 
        %fitness. 
         
        deficit=0; 
        for i=6:(question(size(question,1),2)-1999) 
            deficit=(1/(1+delta)^(i-1-5))*(policy(3,i)*wpay(:,i)' 
            *watupdated(:,i)-policy(2,i)*wpayavg(:,i)'*ratupdated(:,i))  
            + deficit; 
        end 
  
        %OBJECTIVE FUNCTION is calculated... 
        %For all years in the horizon, 2005-2060 (the index i starts from 
        %6 since the dataset contained 2000-2060 data), the revenues of 
        %SSI CR*wages*watupdated for all ages available is calculated and 
        %subtracted from the expenditures of SSI, CR*avgwages*ratupdated 
        %for all ages available, to be brought to 2005 terms by the 
        %discounting function. The deficit for each year is added to the 
        %total deficit to find the accumulated deficit. 
         
        fitness=abs(1/(deficit+0.0001)); 
         
        % Fitness is found by reciprocating the total deficit. 
         
        first_generation(pop,chromosome_size+1)=fitness; 
         
        %Corresponding fitness values is appended to the parent 
        %chromosomes. 
         
    end 
     
    fitSum=sum(first_generation(:,chromosome_size+1)); 
     
    %Fitnesses of all chromosomes are added. 
     
    [topfitsinturns(turns), top_fit_row]= 
    max(first_generation(:,chromosome_size+1)); 
    second_generation(1,:)= 
    first_generation(top_fit_row,1:chromosome_size); 
     
    %The fittest chromosome is transferred to the next generation  
    %directly (Elitism) 
     
    fit(turns,:)=first_generation(top_fit_row,:); 
     
    %The fittest elemnt in the generation is saved for archiving purposes. 
     
    for pop=2:popsize 
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        %Creation of next pop_size-1 children. 
         
        for i=1:2 
            n=rand*fitSum; 
             
            %select a random point in the fit sum. 
             
            head_count=0; 
            okflag=0; 
            current_sum=0; 
            while okflag==0 
                 
                %We move on to find the parent by adding the fitnesses the 
                %chromosomes until 
                %we first exceed the random fitness point. That point 
                %becomes our parent. 
                 
                if current_sum+ 
                    first_generation(head_count+1,chromosome_size+1)>n 
                    okflag=1; 
                    parent(i,:)= 
                    first_generation(head_count+1,1:chromosome_size); 
                     
                    %if the random point is less than the sum of variables, 
                    %the chromosome with the next head count value is 
                    %chosen as the parent. 
                     
                else 
                    current_sum=current_sum+ 
                    first_generation(head_count+1,chromosome_size+1); 
                    head_count=head_count+1; 
                     
                  %Add the fitness of the current chromosome if the current 
                  %fitness sum value is still less than the random one. It 
                  %means that we still could not find the chromosome we 
                  %were searching for. 
                 
                end 
            end 
             
            %We do this operation for two parents 
             
        end 
        cross_over_point=ceil(rand*chromosome_size); 
        chosen_child=ceil(rand+0.5); 
         
        %Two parents are found. Cross-over points are chosen. The child to  
        %be chosen is decided by another random operator. 
         
        temp=parent(1,cross_over_point); 
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        parent(1,cross_over_point)=parent(2,cross_over_point); 
        parent(2,cross_over_point)=temp; 
         
        %Cross-over at the chosen point is made. Two children are  
        % created. 
        if rand<mutation_probability 
            mutation_point=ceil(rand*chromosome_size); 
            parent(chosen_child,mutation_point)= 
            abs(floor(parent(chosen_child,mutation_point)-0.5)); 
        end 
         
        %Mutation at an arbitrary point is made with 0.07 probability. 
         
        second_generation(pop,:)=parent(chosen_child,:); 
         
        %Chosen child becomes member of the next generations. 
     
    end 
    first_generation=second_generation; 
     
    %Generation of children become parents. 
     
end 
  
%The algorithms creates the populations for all turns and then finds out 
%the best chromosomes. The best chromosome of the final population becomes 
%the policy choice once it is converted to a policy by the below code, 
%which was already explained above. 
  
  
whereAmI=1; 
        for i=1:size(question,1) 
            for ind=1:3  
                if question(i,index(ind))==0 
                    for j=question(i,1):question(i,2) 
                        policy(ind,j-1999)=question(i,index(ind)-2); 
                    end 
                elseif question(i,index(ind))==inf 
                    for j=question(i,1):question(i,2) 
                        policy(ind,j-1999)=policy(ind,j-2000); 
                    end    
                else 
                    for k=1:question(i,index(ind)) 
                        powerarray(k)=2^(k-1); 
                    end 
                    for j=question(i,1):question(i,2) 
                        policy(ind,j-1999)=first_generation(pop,whereAmI: 
                        whereAmI-1+question(i,index(ind)))*powerarray' 
                        *((question(i,index(ind)-1) 
                        -question(i,index(ind)-2))/ 
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                        (2^question(i,index(ind))-1)) 
                        +question(i,index(ind)-2); 
                    end 
                    whereAmI=whereAmI+question(i,index(ind)); 
                    powerarray=0; 
                     
                end 
            end 
        end 
        %arbtirary chromosome changed into policy 
        %code for calculating usefulness 
        newwatrat; 
        deficit(1:5)=0; 
        deficityear(1:5)=0; 
        for i=6:(question(size(question,1),2)-1999) 
            deficit(i)=(1/(1+delta)^(i-1-5))*(policy(3,i) 
            *wpay(:,i)'*watupdated(:,i)-policy(2,i) 
            *wpayavg(:,i)'*ratupdated(:,i)) + deficit(i-1);             
        end 
         
 
A.2 The Population Update Program (newwatrat) 
 
watupdated=wat; 
ratupdated=rat; 
 
% New wat and rat variables are created in the workspace.  
 
for j=1:size(policy(3,:),2)  
 
%Under the original matrix size(policy(3,:),2)=61, we are operating on all years 
     
       for ages 38:(policy(1,j)-1) 
  
       %We operate on ages 38 through minimum retirement age for the current     
%year.  
 
       watupdated(age-14,j)=watupdated(age-14,j)+ ratupdated(age-37,j); 
        
%Retirees are transferred to be workers if they are not eligible for retirement. 
 
ratupdated(age-37,j)=0; 
 
%Number of such retirees naturally drop to zero. 
 
    end 
end 
 
 65 
%Retirement Age Update is Complete 
 
 
policyrrcr=[[0.65,0.2];policy(2:3,:)']; 
 
%Pre-2000 situation is appended to policy vector for computational ease. 
  
for j=1:61 
    deltaCR=policyrrcr(j+1,2)-policyrrcr(j,2); 
    CRold=policyrrcr(j,2); 
    deltaRR=policyrrcr(j+1,1)-policyrrcr(j,1); 
    RRold=policyrrcr(j,1); 
 
%Policy difference from the previuos year is calculated.  
 
    for year=j:61 
 
    %For all years following the policy change year… 
 
        for age=policy(1,j):75 
 
        % for every cohort eligible for retirement… 
 
            workerchange=-1/2*(wage_elasticity*watupdated(age-
14,year)*deltaCR/(1-CRold)+pension_elasticity*ratupdated(age-
37,year)*deltaRR/RRold); 
 
             %the change in the number of workers is calculated. 
 
            if workerchange<0 
                watupdated(age-14,year)=watupdated(age-14,year)+workerchange; 
                ratupdated(age-37,year)=ratupdated(age-37,year)-workerchange; 
 
            %if this change is negative for any cohort, then by the Dwat function, this 
affect is applied to that cohort. 
 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
 
 
%The program finishes updating the worker-retiree tables. It is ready for 
%evaluation. 
